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CAN IT REALLYBE UNCONSTITUTIONALTO 
REGULATE PRODUCT SAFETY INFORMATION? 
David Cohen * 
Introduction 
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have 
confirmed the worst suspicions of many that deliberate constitu- 
tional silence on the protection of economic and property interests 
would be ineffective in preventing judicial interpretations which 
envelop a range of corporate conduct with the legitimacy of consti- 
tutional protection. Judicial interpretation of s. 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Ford v. Quebec 
(Attorney General)' and in Irwin Toy v.  Quebec (Attorney 
G e n e r ~ l ) , ~  has extended constitutional protection to "commercial 
speech" - corporate expressive conduct intended to further 
economic interests by encouraging a market transaction, or 
providing information relating to the market transaction. Charter 
protection is subject, of course, to the government's opportunity 
under s. 1 of the Charter to justlfy the restrictions on corporate 
expression which were imposed by governmental action. These 
developments raise important questions concerning the constitu- 
tionality of much of Canada's information-based product safety 
regulatory framework. Judicial protection of commercial speech is 
a response to the typical corporate claim that:3 
- 
Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This paper was 
delivered as a contribution to the Symposium on Commercial Free Speech and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms held as part of the programme of the 19th 
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law at the Faculty of Law, University 
of Toronto, on October 13-14,1989. 
(1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [I9881 2 S.C.R. 712. Canadians thus can boast of the dubious 
achievement of reaching, within the first decade of the Charter, the point that Americans 
had taken a century to accomplish. See J.W. Memll, "First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Advertising" (1976), 44  U. Chi. L. Rev. 205. Memll reviews the history of 
the commercial free speech doctrine which was unprotected before 1975 under Valentine 
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Until the mid-1970s, one could say with some 
confidence that "the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint[s] on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising." Memll, ibid., at p. 207. 
(1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [I9891 1 S.C.R. 927. 
See E. Bardach and R. Kagan, Going by the Book (Philadelphia, Temple University 
55 
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. . . mandatory disclosure for such political purposes can become a 
mechanism whereby the government forces sellers to undertake an uncom- 
pensated program of public education - or propaganda, depending on 
one's viewpoint - thereby turning their packages into mini billboards for 
messages designed to persuade rather than to prevent deception. 
In this paper, I examine the impact of these decisions on 
information-based product safety regulation which, in a variety of 
guises in Canada, can be said to restrict manufacturers', distrib- 
utors' and marketers' ability to "express" them~elves.~ In the end, 
I conclude that, if one appreciates the justification for and the 
processes by which this kind of product safety regulation is insti- 
tuted, there is only a small risk that the current regulatory activity 
will be held unconstitutional. When one takes into account the 
degree of co-operation between business and government in 
establishing the content of most regulatory activity and the benign 
nature of most of Canada's packaging and labelling requirements, 
one is led to the almost inescapable conclusion that the Charter 
challenges do not pose a serious threat to the existence of these 
laws. 
Yet that conclusion does not mean that we should completely 
disregard the impact of the Charter and the courts on the 
regulatory process. Perceived threats of constitutional challenges 
are now aspects of the environment in which regulators must 
work. There is undoubtedly an increased risk that protecting 
commercial speech will discourage' more aggressive regulatory 
strategies and the enforcement of existing legislation - areas 
where activity is already at a near stand~till.~ The protection of 
commercial speech implied by the recent events contributes to the 
confusion, contradiction and uncertainty of much of product 
safety regulation in Canada.6 Further policy developments will be 
Press, 1982), p. 259. This is perhaps what lies behind the striking down of state legislation 
restricting advertising by utility companies as a conservation strategy. See Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v.  Public Service Com'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
4 For the purposes ofathis paper I assume that the proposition that governmental action 
which requires a certain kind or content of expression, whether through negative or 
positive informational requirements, equally limits a corporation's choice to express 
"meaning" with regard to the constituents, performance, operation or other character- 
istic of the products it sells. See Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 2 ,  at p. 606. 
5 See E. Belobaba, "The Development of Consumer Protection Regulation: 1945 to 1984", 
in I. Bemier and S. Lajoie, eds., Consumer Protection, Environmental Law and 
Corporate Power, Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development, Prospects 
for Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985). See also, J.C. Shaul and M.J. 
Trebilcock, "The Administration of the Federal Hazardous Products Act" (1982-83), 7 
C.B.L.J. 2. 
6 See Belobaba,supra, footnote 5,passim, especially at pp. 46-62. 
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even more dependent on and influenced by legal norms - a fact 
which has elicited concern in the past.' In the end, however, 
notwithstanding the enormous impact of Ford and Irwin Toy on 
the political economy of Quebec, regulators concerned with 
product safety regulation will largely go about their business the 
way they always have.8 
1. The Legal Environment 
In late 1988, in Ford v.  Quebec (Attorney General),g the 
Supreme Court of Canada was confronted with the question of 
whether the Charter's "freedom of expression" section should be 
extended to protect corporations as well as individuals. In Ford, 
the Supreme Court expressly refrained1° from settling the question 
of the application of the Charter to consumer protection issues. 
Although the decision in Irwin Toy, handed down four months 
later, has in large measure diminished the significance of the 
earlier cases in regard to commercial free speech, the sentiment of 
the court in the earlier appeals remains instructive. In Ford, the 
court placed particular emphasis on the ability of the government 
to regulate the kind of information available to consumers in the 
market-place, and indicated that "judicial regulation of govern- 
7 Ibid., at p. 36. 
8 That is, notwithstanding the assimilation of political debate and advertising represented in 
cases like Irwin Toy, I predict that the Charter will thus not significantly redefine the 
boundaries of the current regulation of the economy and economic activities by the 
federal and provincial governments. See T.H. Jackson and J.C. Jeffries, Jr., "Com- 
mercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment" (1979), 65 Va. L. 
Rev. 1. They criticized Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in which the Supreme Court invalidated state legis- 
lation restricting pharmaceutical price advertising, as "a contradiction of the heretofore 
settled idea that the Constitution tolerates extensive regulation of the economy". Ibid., at 
p. 32. 
The view that cases like Irwin Toy should not be interpreted as a radical judicial attack 
on economic regulation is supported by recent American experience as well. Tracy 
Westen, in "The First Amendment: Barrier or Impetus to FTC Advertising Remedies?" 
(1980), 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 487, writes that the extension of commercial speech 
protection to "issue advertising" in the United States has led some to say that "Virginia 
Pharmacy and its progeny have imposed an unprecedented restraint on the FTC to police 
unfair and deceptive trade practices." Ibid., at p. 490. She concludes, none the less, that 
"the commercial speech cases mandate no 'fundamental change in basic FTC policies". 
Ibid. 
Supra, footnote 1 .  
'OThe court wrote "We are not asked in this case to deal with the distinct issue of the 
permissible scope of regulation of advertising (for example, to protect consumers)." See 
Ford, ibid., at p. 619. 
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mental regulation" in this context was problematical to say the 
least. l1 
The Zrwin Toy appeal addressed the constitutionality of one of 
the most far-reaching information style consumer protection 
provisions in Canada -the prohibition of advertising directed at 
children in Quebec.12 The case articulated a formal "test" for 
determining whether freedom of expression has been breached. If 
corporate activity "conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it 
has expressive content andprima facie falls within the scope of the 
guarantee".13 The definition encompasses and protects virtually 
the entire range of human conduct ,I4 and applies equally to both 
individuals and corporate bodies. The sheer breadth of the test 
suggests that a vast majority of the commercial free speech adjudi- 
cation will be determined by a s. 1 analysis.15 
The question of whether "information-based" consumer 
product safety regulation is in danger of an industry-led assault 
that uses C.J. Dickson's judgment in Irwin Toy as its main 
weapon, requires us to understand something about the content 
and processes which characterize this regulatory arena. In the next 
part of this paper, I briefly review the rationale for information 
regulation, its place in the regulatory milieu and how information 
policies are developed in the regulatory process. 
11 The court based its decision not to exclude commercial expression from constitutional 
protection on the fact that it, "protects listeners as well as speakers [and] plays a 
significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, and 
important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy". Ibid., footnote 
1, at p. 618. 
12 Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9 (R.S.Q., c. P-40.1), ss. 248,249 and 252 and 
Regulations respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q. 1981, c. 
P-40.1,r. l,ss.87to91. 
13 Zrwin Toy, supra, footnote 2, at p. 607. 
14 lbid., supra, footnote 2, at pp. 605-9. J. Weinberg, in "Constitutional Protection of 
Commercial Speech" (1982), 82 Col. L. Rev. 720, identifies four values promoted by the 
First Amendment - political self-government, self-fulfillment through self-expression, 
discovery of "truth" and developments through perception. While these do not precisely 
track the values articulated by Dickson C.J., his language in Invin Toy indicates that he 
and Weinberg believe that the first, third and fourth are furthered by the protection of 
commercial speech. See Irwin Toy, ibid., at p. 614. 
15 There is a growing body of literature on the development of the court's approach to 
governmental attempts to justify its actions under s. 1. Most take the view that the 
expansive reading of the substantive freedoms in the Charter has had the effect of 
throwing much of the debate into s. 1. See P.A. Chapman, "The Politics of Judging: 
Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1986), 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 867; A. 
Petter and P. Monahan, "Developments in Constitutional Law: 1986-87 Term" (1988), 
10 S. Ct. L. Rev. 61; and R. Elliott, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 - 
Erosion of the Common Front" (1987), 12 Queen's L.J. 277. All agree that the fluidity 
and imprecision of the s. 1 analysis largely precludes prediction based on textual analysis. 
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2. The Regulatory Environment 
Depending on one's definition of "restrict"l6 there is an 
enormous range of regulatory initiatives through which federal 
and provincial governments restrict a form of expression in order 
to control access by others to its meaning in an attempt to protect 
individuals from engaging in transactions without adequate or 
with inaccurate information.17 The disclosure of ingredients on 
food packages,18 fibre content in percentages on most cloth 
garments19 and safety warnings on containers of poisonous 
materials20 are typical examples of statutorily mandated provision 
of information. The federal Hazardous Products Act21 prohibits 
the manufacture, sale or advertising of a collection of products 
ranging from science sets to carpets to bags of charcoal unless a 
warning referring to potential safety risks is prominently displayed 
on the label. Other federal statutes22 also can be seen as restricting 
a form of expression by requiring that certain products must be 
sold with specific information, presented in a specific manner. 
Provincial legislation, especially in the area of pesticides 
regulation23 similarly contributes to the array of information- 
based regulatory policies employed in response to product safety 
risks. Mandatory disclosure of information is simply the most 
pervasive form of product safety regulation in Canada.24 
16 AS I point out below, there may be an argument that government regulations which 
require additional information from commercial enterprises do not limit speech. It is 
equally logical, however, to treat mandatory disclosure requirements as more offensive 
than mere restrictions on speech conduct, in so far as they force individuals to say things 
which they do not believe. 
l7 This is the test applied in the majority judgment in Invin Toy, to distinguish expression 
from non-expressive conduct. 
18 See Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27). Food and 
Drugs Act Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, B.01.008. 
19See Textile Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 46 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. T-10). 
Textile Labelling and Advertising Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1551, s. 4. 
"See Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9). Pest 
Control Product Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1253, ss. 27 to39. 
21 R.S.C. 1985,~.  H-3: 
22The most significant are the Weights and Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-6; Pest 
Control Products Act, supra, footnote 20; and the Food and Drug Act, supra, footnote 
18. 
23 see, for example, the Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 376. 
Z4 The government also prohibits certain foods from being labelled in a certain manner 
(e.g., "low-calorie" or "for low-sodium diets") unless they meet standards set by the 
federal Food and Drug Act. See Food and Drug Act Regulations, supra, footnote 18. 
These regulations set standards which must be met before products can be marketed with 
a particular name. This type of regulation is similar in intent to the more obvious prohi- 
bition of false, misleading or deceptive packaging, labelling or advertising. 
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Information-based consumer protection policies can conven- 
iently be placed at one end of a continuum reflecting the level of 
intervention in the market by government. Given the choice of 
direct government delivery of goods and services, the nationali- 
zation of private industry, taxation policy, subsidies, licensing and 
certification requirements, product performance and design 
standards, product bans, insurance requirements, it is obvious 
that information-based product safety policies are the least 
intrusive regulatory instrument available to governments whose 
objectives include the provision of "safety". 
Even with information-based product safety regulatory policies, 
one can identify at least three distinct regulatory instruments 
available to governments, which in turn represent different 
degrees of government intervention in the market.25 Governments 
may require corporations to label products with specified infor- 
mation in a specified form to ensure disclosure to consumers; 
governments can set performance and design standards that must 
be met before the product can be labelled in a certain manner; and 
finally, governments can prohibit the dissemination of infor- 
mation, in particular deceptive packaging and labelling, 
altogether.26 
Information-based product safety regulation of the kind 
described above has been the subject of considerable attention in 
recent years.27 As the study of law and economics continues to 
burgeon so too do the plaudits for government regulation that 
relies heavily on information p0licies.~8 The regulatory objective 
25 See M.A. Utton, The Economics of Regulating Industry (1986), Chapter 4, especially at 
p. 38. To the information remedies I have mentioned, we can add the financing of 
independent organizations that provide information to consumers which inform them of 
product characteristics. 
26 Moving from information policies to those that are more intrusive, the government may 
employ content standards that have to be met before a product can be introduced into the 
market, and may ban products from the market entirely. While these are clearly more 
intrusive than information-based regulation, the current treatment of constitutional 
liberties has not extended Charter protection to trade. See, infra, at Part 4 where the 
implications of this omission are discussed. 
27 After occupying a "slum dwelling in the town of economics" for many years, the study of 
information economics has grown to the point where one somewhat presumptive theorist 
deemed the 1970s the "information economics decade". See M.A. Utton, supra, 
footnote 25, at Chapter 4; H. Beales, R. Craswell and S.C. Salop, "The Efficient 
Regulation of Consumer Information" (1981), 24 J. Law & Econ. 491. 
28 Those who have argued that information policies are under-utilized include R. Reich, 
"Toward a New Consumer Protection" (1979), 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1; M. Pertschuk, 
Revolt Against Regulation (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982), p. 149; 
Bardach and Kagan, supra, footnote 3, and Utton, supra, footnote 25. 
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that consumers possess adequate information in market transac- 
tions is consistent with an important assumption about infor- 
mation underlying much of modem economic the0rizing.~9 And 
for many reasons, that assumption will not be realized absent 
government intervention. 
Markets in information often fail to produce optimal quantities 
and quality of information to consumers for reasons which are not 
difficult to unde r~ tand .~~  First, information related to product 
safety and performance is a public good, and because the producer 
cannot always appropriate the entire gains from its utilization, it 
will often be under-produced. Second, the marginal costs to the 
producer of disseminating the information will almost by 
definition exceed the value to it of disclosing negative product 
safety information, and again the information will be under- 
produced. Third, information may be under-produced where 
consumers cannot efficiently police the accuracy and completeness 
of the information at point of ~ a l e . ~ l  Fourth, using the litigation 
system to .internalize these costs will rarely correct the under- 
production given the disincentive to litigate, limits on recovery of 
certain kinds of losses, and the status of the distributor as a repeat 
player. 
The resulting market failure, due to consumers' deficient infor- 
mation and information processing capabilities, provides the 
strongest rationale for most information policies. They provide an 
information solution to an information problem. The fact that 
information policies - especially mandatory disclosure - 
maintain the myth of consumer sovereignty and for the most part 
avoid the paternalistic  implication^^^ of standard setting and 
product bans accounts for much of the current popularity of infor- 
mation policies. More important, information-based remedies 
permit producers to make relatively unconstrained choices about 
- - 
29 See Belobaba, supra, footnote 5, at p. 43. 
30 These points are developed in some detail in Beales, Craswell and Salop, supra, footnote 
27. 
31 Thus market failure may be most likely where the true wsts and risks of a product are not 
obvious to the consumer at the time of purchase, conditions which are increasingly 
prevalent in a market-place replete with complex goods. 
32 See Reich, supra, footnote 28. He emphasises the non-paternalistic basis of this 
conception of replation. For an article that confronts and attempts to rebunk this 
aversion to explicit paternalistic motives, see D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and 
Unequal Bargaining Power" (1982), 41 Md L. Rev. 563. 
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product characteristics, retaining the dynamism of the market in 
responding to changes in consumer preferences and technology. 
Finally, information-based product safety regulation permits a 
range of products accommodating a wide range of consumer 
preferences towards mixes of price, product quality and safety, 
rather than imposing a single choice on all consumers. 
The transformation of this model of informational failure into 
practice through the development of information-based product 
safety regulation has been left in Canada to departmental bureau- 
crats at both the provincial and federal levels of government. An 
analysis of a typical regulatory institution reveals several 
important insights into how the economic theory justifying 
information-based product safety regulation is transformed in the 
regulatory process. It is that process which will determine the 
likely impact of cases like Irwin Toy on information-based 
regulatory policies which restrict commercial speech. 
A typical regulatory apparatus which may serve this purpose is 
the current federal administration of the Hazardous Products Act 
- a department to which considerable research has been 
directed.33 The Product Safety Branch administers the Act under 
supervision by the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. 
The Act is administered as criminal legislation, containing 
maximum penalties of up to two years in prison or six months and 
a $1,000 fine. The administrative process has been described as 
"internally open''34 and non-adversarial, where the major industry 
actors are involved intensively in the regulatory process, and 
where the system is considerably less open to other potentially 
affected partie~.~S When a product is identified as being potentially 
hazardous, an advisory committee is convened consisting of 
33 See R. Hirshhorn, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", in D.Dewees, 
ed., The Regulation of Quality (Toronto, Butterworths, 1983), Chapter 7; Shaul and 
Trebilcock, supra, footnote 5; R. Hirshhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the 
Hazardous Product Act, Tech. Rep. No. 10, Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa, 
Economic Council of Canada, 1981). 
34 See Hirshhorn, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", ibid., at p. 177. 
35 Ibid. at p. 178. The literature advancing the theory that industry has to some extent 
"captured" the regulators is considerable. For an empirical study of the American scene 
see P. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton, N . J . ,  
Princeton University Press, 1981). One description of the Canadian experience is 
contained in R.G. Shapiro and D.R. Hughes, An Analysis of the Effects of Government 
Regulations on the Canadian Fruit and Vegetable Processing Industry, Working Paper 
No. 11, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation Reference (Ottawa, Economic 
Council of Canada, 1980), at p. 67. 
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members of the affected industry, standards organizations, 
importers and other government agencies.36 That advisory panel 
co-operates with members of the Product Safety Branch in 
designing the regulatory response, if any, to the alleged safety 
risk. The relative weakness of organized consumer advocacy 
groups in Canada increases the relative influence of the regulated 
industries in this regulatory process, which combines with the 
structure of the regulatory process to produce what has been 
described as a "somewhat lax" enforcement Aggressive 
regulatory action has also been hindered by budgetary restraints 
and the absence of a reliable source of information on product- 
caused injuries .38 
While industry enjoys considerable influence in the regulatory 
process, it has nothing to gain by revealing this to the public. Thus, 
despite this congenial atmosphere, regulatory intervention is often 
portrayed by industry as being too heavy-handed.39 A recent 
assessment of federal consumer protection regulation concludes 
"on paper at least, Canadian consumer protection legislation can 
almost compete with such pro-consumer jurisdictions as Sweden 
and Japan" .40 
This regulatory structure is coupled with process characteristics 
which are extremely relevant to an assessment of the constitu- 
tional validity of information-based regulation. For more than a 
decade the federal government has required relatively sophisti- 
cated socio-economic impact analyses ("SEIA) to accompany 
each new proposed regulatory change in the "Health, Safety and 
Fairness" areas under federal juri~diction.~~ In order to provide 
36 Hirshhom, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", ibid., at p. 177. 
37 See Shaul and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 5; and Hirshhom, Product Safety Regulation 
and the Hazardous Products Act, supra, footnote 33, at p. 111. 
38 R. Hirshhom, writing in 1980, reports that the number of staff has remained the same 
since the early years of the programme and suggests that the fact that Canada spends 5% 
of what the United States spends in this field is a disproportionately low amount. The 
need for a system that provides regulators with reliable information from medical practi- 
tioners on the cause of injuries is emphasized by both by Hirshhom, ibid. at pp. 114,115, 
and by Belobaba, supra, footnote 5 at p. 74. 
39 The setting of strict standards for hockey helmets, and the initial product ban (subse- 
quently revoked) on 1.5L glass carbonated beverage containers have both been attacked 
as being inefficient. Hirshhom, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", 
supra, footnote 33, at pp. 193-4 and 184-5. 
Belobaba, supra, footnote 5, at p. 69, emphasis added. 
41 Socioeconomic Impact Analysis, Chapter 490, Administrative Policy Manual, Treasury 
Board of Canada (December, 1979). 
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guidance to regulators and coherent rationales for regulatory 
intervention to the public, the federal government requires all new 
non-emergency regulatory amendments and additions to be 
subjected to an analysis which attempts to assess the social costs 
and benefits that would result from proposed regulatory action. 
While most would concede42 that such cost-benefit analysis 
represents a useful analytical tool in complex regulatory decision- 
making, it is equally clear that there are dangers in employing it 
uncritically. The measurement of the value of differing levels of 
inflation, the impact of regulatory intervention on market struc- 
tures, the international trade implications of proposed regulatory 
action, and the valuation of human life and pain and suffering are 
at best inexact, and at worst simply a conceptual charade. The 
failure to develop a reliable source of information describing 
product-related deaths and injuries and the problems of uncertain 
scientific data43 lessen the supposed rationality of the socio- 
economic impact analyses. In addition to the problem of uncer- 
tainty, Belobaba has described the particularly narrow perspective 
which characterizes the economic approach to regulation and the 
associated implication that the "right" answer is actually there to 
be found, as a major impediment to better consumer protection 
law in Canada.44 The danger is that regulators searching for some 
solidity in the shifting sand will come to rely too heavily on what 
can often be only marginally useful economic analyses. Tuohy 
fears that the impact analysis will be used in large measure as a 
stalling tactic when more immediate action is required.45 The 
technicality of the analysis means that many unorganized and 
under-funded groups will be effectively marginalized from the 
regulatory process. 
Nonetheless, the economic model which justifies information- 
based regulatory intervention, together with the administrative 
structures and analytical processes involved in regulatory inter- 
vention in this area, provide the government with a powerful 
42 For two vocal opponents of the use of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, see M. 
Kelman, "Cost-Benefit Analysis- An Ethical Critique" (1981), 5 Regulation 33; and D. 
Kennedy, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique" (1983), 33 Stan. 
L. Rev. 387. 
43 See C. Tuohy, "Regulation and Scientific Complexity: Decision Rules and Processes in 
the Occupational Health Arena" (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 562. 
* Belobaba,supra, footnote 5, at p. 54. 
45 Tuohy, supra, footnote 43, at p. 575. 
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weapon with which to demonstrate to the judiciary that its 
regulatory intervention was justified. Moreover, given the 
relatively non-intrusive character of most information-based 
product safety regulation, the courts are unlikely to be aggressive 
participants in a close technical re-evaluation of the social cost- 
benefit analysis on which the information-based product safety 
regulation is supposedly based. Not only is the analysis complex, 
the data uncertain and the valuations imprecise, but, as one 
commentator has put it, "One can find . . . some spill-over cost 
rationale for regulating almost anything."46 
3. Does Protecting Commercial Speech Matter? 
The Supreme Court decision to assimilate political debate to 
advertising and thus the creation of a guarantee of freedom of 
commercial expression in the Charter has generated serious 
doubts about the constitutionality of much of the information 
policies currently employed in Canada. The equal footing that 
corporate entities and individuals are given in Dickson C.J.C.3 
judgment in Irwin Toy, and the fact that two of the five sitting 
judges47 did not see Quebec's violation of s. 2(b) as justified under 
s. 1, would seem to support that concern. As Bob Sharpe 
predicted, however, a more careful analysis of the landscape 
should dispel much of that fear.48 That is, the characteristic 
structure of most of our federal and provincial information 
policies, the extent to which they are enforced, the role the 
regulated enjoy in formulating policy, and a consideration of 
recent Charter adjudication all suggest that radical fears of the 
Charter being used to strike at these provisions are almost totally 
unju~tified.~g The reasons why the Supreme Court's posture does 
46 S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, Haward University Press, 1982), pp. 
23-6. 
47 McIntyre and Beetz JJ. dissented in the result, writing that freedom of expression, 
commercial or otherwise, "should not be suppressed except in cases where urgent and 
compelling reasons exist and then only to the extent and for the time necessary for the 
protection of the community". Irwin Toy (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at p. 637, [I9891 1 
S.C.R. 927. 
R. Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and the Charter" (1987), 37 U.T.L.J. 229. 
49Thus again Canada will track the American experience. See J. Weinberg, "Constitu- 
tional Protection of Commercial Speech" (1982) 82 Col. L. Rev. 720. As he puts it, "a 
restriction on particular commercial speech will always be valid where the restriction 
does not interfere with the transmittal of the information in question to the public." 
Ibid., at p. 747. 
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not pose a serious threat to existings0 information-based product 
safety regulation can conveniently be divided into two categories. 
The first, which I call "doctrinal", can be developed from the 
language and rhetorical elements in Irwin Toy and Ford. The 
second, which I call "practical", reflects the Realpolitik of product 
safety regulation in Canada. 
While I am not suggesting that reading past Supreme Court 
judgments concerning the Charter will provide us with an answer 
as to how the court will act in the future, such an exercise will help 
us to recognize strands in certain judges' thinking that may come 
together in the future.51 That there are ready-made formal 
responses that can be employed to defend an attack on the consti- 
tutionality of information policies - especially mandatory 
disclosure - is certainly of considerable import. 
The first argument which one can make to defend most of the 
current information-based product safety regulation is that state 
action which requires information about product safety does not 
"restrict" expression. As we have seen, the major policy strategy 
employed by regulators in Canada requires mandatory disclosure 
of certain information. This regulatory strategy permits the logical 
argument to be made that requiring the disclosure of information 
does not entail a "restriction" on expression. Mandatory 
disclosure certainly diminishes corporations' absolute freedom 
with regard to the entire informational package associated with a 
particular consumer product, but it does not prevent corporations 
from displaying whatever message, in whatever form they wish, so 
long as it is not deemed to be deceptive or misleading.52 
50 As I argue below, however, what is disturbing is that the courts may use the Charter to 
regulate more intrusive regulatory intervention which employs information-based 
policies to achieve product safety objectives. 
51 That is, the exercise involves identifying ideas in which judges have faith, and assumes 
that judges will, at least in the short run, act consistently within their own belief system. 
52 Of course, precisely the opposite argument can be made - that is, that forced speech is 
even more demeaning to one's sense of identity and exercise of autonomy in the market- 
place. My point is that the formal arguments can be structured, not that they are in any 
sense at all determinative. And I realize, of course, that mandatory disclosure can be said 
to restrict expression in so far as it is impossible to say simultaneously what the 
government demands you say, and say what you would say without state intervention. 
The decision one reaches on this kind of argument depends on whether one chooses to 
conceive of the "package" of speech as a whole - which permits one to say that the state 
has restricted expression; or whether one chooses to conceive of the "package" of speech 
as consisting of two parts -which permits one to say that the state has not restricted 
expression, but has simply required additional expressive conduct. Of course, it is impos- 
sible to say which conception is the right one. 
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The likelihood that the court will view mandatory disclosure in 
this fashion is reinforced by the language on the constitutional 
values underlying the protection of commercial free speech in 
both Ford and Irwin Toy. The objective of most information- 
based regulation - that informed consumers are essential to the 
fair and efficient functioning of a free market economys3 - is 
almost identical to Dickson C.J.C.'s idea that the protection of 
commercial speech is founded on the constitutional value of 
permitting Canadians to make informed economic choices, and 
thus through the market achieve autonomy and self-fulfillment.S4 
Disclosure can be seen as facilitating the development of a 
competitive market-place, rather than as "substituting regulation 
for competition".ss 
That is, mandatory disclosure helps to create those "auton- 
omous and informed consumers" with whom the court is so 
concerned in both Ford and Irwin Toy. The objective of 
mandatory disclosure and the justification which the court uses in 
Ford for limiting governmental control of information are 
identical. If Irwin Toy manifests judicial concern with the 
consumer's need for truthful information, then regulation 
involving mandatory disclosure is consistent with the achievement 
of the judicial goal. 
Even if information regulation is said to violate s. 2(b) of the 
Charter, there is a strong intuition that information-based product 
safety regulation will be particularly easy to defend and thus be 
"demonstrably justified" in accordance with s. 1 of the Charter. 
The not so "stringent standard of justification" of the OakesS7 test 
will likely permit the governments to defend successfully Charter 
challenges .s8 
53 See, for example, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. (1976), ss. 1451-61. 
54 Ford v. Quebec (Atforney General) (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at p. 618, [I9881 2 S.C.R. 
712. . 
55 Breyer, supra, footnote 46, at p. 161. 
56 Moreover, mandatory disclosure of certain information on packages and labels is not, 
most would agree, a sustantial infringement of producers' expressive rights. Perhaps 
Wilson J.'s words that not every trivial or insubstantial effect on one's rights constitutes a 
breach of the Charter, would be used by judges to justify upholding the legislation in 
these circumstances. See R. v. Jones (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569, [I9861 2 S.C.R. 284. 
57 This is the language used in R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, [I9861 1 S.C.R. 103 
at pp. 138-40. Some argue that the test has been relaxed in R. v. Edward Books and A n  
Ltd. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [I9861 2 S.C.R. 713, but the precise formulaic expression 
is hardly determinative. 
58 This is the approach, not surprisingly, which has been adopted in recent American 
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The second aspect of the proportionality test articulated in 
Oakes - presumably the most difficult to meet - requires that 
the government demonstrate that it violates one's rights "as little 
as [is reasonably] It is particularly well-framed to 
permit justification of information-based product safety 
regulation policies. As we have seen, requiring certain infor- 
mation to accompany products introduced into the market is tradi- 
tionally regarded as a relatively non-intrusive regulatory 
instrument. Even the prohibition of certain information on a 
package or label presumably infringes one's freedom to operate in 
the market-place only marginally when compared to the alterna- 
tives - product design and performance standards and product 
bans. 
More important than the formal reasons for the view that the 
status quo will not be affected by Ford and Irwin Toy, are the 
practical political realities of consumer product safety regulation. 
The picture drawn earlier of the operations of the federal Product 
Safety Branch leads to a conclusion that most information-based 
product safety regulatory initiatives are not presently in danger. 
The fact that regulators and representatives from the regulated 
enterprises co-operate to a large degree in policy formulation 
means that the resulting legislation is often not particularly 
damaging to large segments of the industry.60 Even a cursory 
review of the information policies used in Canada now indicate 
decisions which protect commercial speech, but build in a more relaxed standard of 
judicial review. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.  Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council Inc., 425 U.S .  748 (1976), which rejected the distinction between commercial 
and political speech, but which went on to hold that commercial speech would not be 
protected in the same manner, nor to the same degree as other speech. See also, Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
The case has been criticized for largely the same reasons as the Irwin Toy decision. 
That is, expression deserves constitutional protection in so far as it is connected to 
effective self-government, and individual self-fulfillment through free expression. As 
Jackson and Jeffries argue, supra, footnote 8, at p. 6, the protection of commercial 
speech serves "aggregate economic efficiency and consumer opportunity to maximize 
utility in a free market - [but] these values are not appropriate for judicial vindication". 
59 Oakes, supra, footnote 57, at p. 139 S.C.R. See also, Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 47, at 
pp. 624-30. 
60 This point is developed in the American context in C.E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: 
The World's Political-Economic System (New York, Basic Books, 1977). Michael 
Pertschuk, a former Chair of the FederalTrade Commission has written that government 
decision-making in the field of consumer protection has responded to the needs and 
demands of business, and that there has been a failure of equity in government decision- 
making affecting business and consumer. See Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28 at pp. 
114-15. 
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that the full potential of mandatory disclosure to further the 
interests of consumers as not been realized.61 
Larger industries, which have a greater influence on  the 
regulatory process, are simultaneously more capable of absorbing 
compliance costs. These same companies are more likely to have 
an interest as repeat players, as well as the resources, to challenge 
regulatory action as compared to small businesses and importers 
who confront considerably more risks in complex regulatory 
schemes. Thus the incentive to challenge the provisions by those in 
the best position to do so is lowered as the regulations serve in 
some instances as effective barriers to entry into the industry.62 
Furthermore, corporate actors in many industries welcome 
government regulations to the extent that regulations restore the 
confidence of the consumer in the safety of the product.63 
To an outsider, mandatory disclosure of product safety risks and 
prohibitions against disseminating information that is misleading 
or deceptive are clearly not in the interests of any particular 
industry participants. Nevertheless, the lack of serious 
enforcement of many of the regulatory policies, the interests of the 
most powerful in the industry in perpetuating the status quo, and 
the risks of increased negative publicity in relation to product 
safety, all combine to support a prediction that it is unlikely such 
provisions will be challenged in court. 
Finally the existence of detailed socio-economic justifications of 
all new regulatory action in these areas since 1978 provides a 
powerful justifkatory and legitimating weapon to the government. 
Confronted with the apparent rigour of the analyses and evidence 
of the delicate and rational balancing of costs and benefits that is 
much of modern regulation, the courts will likely defer to 
government in the case of most mandatory disclosure regulation. 
61 Life-cycle costing is an area which has not yet been fully developed in Canadian 
regulatory policy. See Belobaba, supra, footnote 5, at p. 38. 
62 This point was made about fair packaging and labelling legislation in the United States in 
the context of package size standardization. See Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28, at p. 147. 
Similarlv. advertising bans have been said to create barriers to entry, and "so to solidify 
or mag;& any mon&ly power wielded by existing successful" fi&. See R.H. porter, 
"The Impact of Government Policy on the U.S. Cigarette Industry" in Empirical 
Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, P.M. Ippolito and D.T. Scheffman, 
eds. (Washington, D.C., Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 1984), p. 
659. 
63 See P. Quirk, "The Food and Drug Administration" in J.O. Wilson, ed., The Politics of 
Regulation (New York, Basic Books, 1980), p. 193. 
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4. It Does Matter After All 
I do not mean by all of this to be saying that the Ford and Zrwin 
Toy decisions will have no significant influence on regulatory 
policy in Canada. General restrictions on advertising, which I 
have purposely set aside in this paper, will very likely suffer . 
serious constitutional defeats. That is, the language in Irwin Toy is 
a clear signal that judges will be somewhat more aggressive in 
assessing legislation that prohibits the disclosure of certain infor- 
mation, or that prohibits advertising in general, in contrast to their 
response to regulation which requires the mandatory disclosure of 
specified information. The latter, of course, furthers the professed 
value which the court implies into the Charter - the creation of 
autonomous and informed consumers. The former, as one 
American jurist put it, involves covert state action to manipulate 
individual choice by depriving the public of information required 
to exercise their aut0nomy.6~ 
Second, if judges really demand that the regulatory agency 
adopt the least restrictive regulatory alternative in order to pass 
the impugned legislation under the Oakes test, there will 
obviously always be less intrusive information-based regulatory 
policies available to governments, including the provision of infor- 
mation directly by the g o ~ e r n m e n t , ~ ~  and the funding of 
independent agencies to produce information whether on a for- 
profit or a not-for-profit basis. That is, legislation which prohibits 
advertising generally, and perhaps more traditional mandatory 
disclosure policies as well, will be said to come within the Charter 
protection as defined in Irwin Toy, and may very well be struck 
down as being too intrusive. 
Third, anyone who reads the Supreme Court's language in Zrwin 
Toy, in respect of "vulnerable groups" who are vulnerable to 
seduction and manip~la t ion ,~~  must have serious doubts about the 
constitutional validity of information policies designed to 
"protect" adults from making choices about their own welfare. 
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.  Public Service Commission of New York, 
supra, footnote 58, at p. 575. 
65 See, for example, the discussion of the information generation and dissemination activ- 
ities of the American Consumer Product Safety Commission in F. Thompson and L.R. 
Jones, Regulatory Policy and Practices (New York, Praeger, 1982) p. 68. 
66The court, in applying the first branch of the Oakes test, is required to say that the 
regulatory objective relates to concerns which are "pressing and substantial in a free and 
democraticsociety". See Oakes, supra, footnote 57, at pp. 138-9S.C.R. 
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There is certainly a strong sense that future courts will be asked to 
limit Irwin Toy to the protection of children and similar vulnerable 
gr0ups.6~ Where the alleged regulatory beneficiaries are adults 
and not children, the pressing and urgent reasons to justify 
regulating speech conduct will be somewhat harder to come by. 
While this will not of itself mean that the legislation will fail, it will 
almost certainly justify a higher degree of scrunity in the latter 
stages of review under s. 1. 
A fourth concern is an increasing sense that claims that 
mandatory disclosure policies are an effective regulatory 
technique cannot always be defended. While the literature in this 
area is somewhat rudimentary, there are several studies which 
demonstrate that consumers ofien do not take advantage of the 
information they are provided with in purchase transactions.68 The 
difficulty with making greater use of information policies is that it 
assumes that we can convey extremely complex and uncertain 
technical data, showing some increased cost or risk, in an unambi- 
guous yet accurate and useful manner across enormous numbers 
of relatively insignificant consumer transactions. The fact that 
many product safety risks are imposed on those who are not 
parties to the original purchase (externalities or spillovers to 
economists) suggests a stronger form of regulation may be 
necessary. Even the most outspoken opponents of standard 
setting and outright product bans recognize the need for them in 
67 The language in Irwin Toy is reminiscent of Blackmun J. who in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v.  Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., supra, footnote 58, railed against 
its "highly paternalistic approach" and counseled the opening of "the channels of 
communication". 
68 See D. Dewees, "The Quality of Consumer Durables: Energy Use" in D. Dewees, ed., 
The Regulation of Quality, supra, footnote 33, at p. 207. E. Belobaba, in Products 
Liability and Personal Injury Compensation in Canada: Towards Integration and 
Rationalization (Ottawa, Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1983), argues that many 
consumers neither read nor care about the consumer product warranties, and that infor- 
mation disclosure requirements and truth in warranty legislation have not had much of an 
impact on consumer decision-making. 
That is not to say, of course, that information policies are ineffective per se. See R.A. 
Posner, "The Federal Trade Commission's Mandated-Disclosure Program: A Critical 
Analysis", in H. Goldschmid, ed., Business Disclosure: Government's Need to Know 
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979). Posner finds that after the cigarette companies starting 
disclosing tar and nicotine levels on their packages the market share of the cigarettes in 
the lower categories climbed dramatically. See also Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28, at pp. 
148-9, who describes the effectiveness of information disclosure in the case of automobile 
gas mileage ratings, energy consumption of consumer durables and the tar and nicotine 
levels of cigarettes. 
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certain instances.69 The question becomes not whether but when 
and how. 
Finally, one should not think that courts will necessarily agree 
that "concrete, material facts found in advertising concerning 
price, quality, and product safety [are] . . . matters which are . . . 
ascertainable by the purveyor and also by the r e g ~ l a t o r " . ~ ~  The 
presentation of socio-economic impact analyses of proposed 
regulatory activity will generate an image of a rationalist model of 
regulation - but the reality of regulation is necessarily much less 
coherent and much more complex than the model. The reality of 
regulation may mean that governments will have only the most 
rudimentary cost-benefit analyses, if they have any at all, to 
defend violations of commercial expression under s. 1 of the 
Charter. 
I suspect that it is for this reason that the Quebec government 
chose not to file numerous reports and studies used by it both in 
enacting the advertising ban and subsequently in reviewing its 
operation - an omission noted by the majority in Irwin Toy.71 I 
suspect that any regulatory agency would have to hesitate before 
presenting a judge with a cost-benefit analysis of regulations under 
the federal Transportation of Dangerous Goods which 
calculated the value of a human life saved as $500,000 corrected 
from American dollar values and for inflation.73 The problem 
becomes transparent when one considers an assessment of 
flammability standards under the federal Hazardous Products 
Act, which took a range of values approaching $1,000,000 for the 
expected 17 lives saved as a result of modified mattress 
standards.74 The apparent objectivity and rationality of this 
approach are further compromised by evidence that much of the 
information required for the analysis is provided by industry 
representatives75 who by definition have an interest in minimizing 
government intervention. 
69 Bardach and Kagan write that "of course an information strategy is . . . inappropriate for 
certain problems and certain objectives." See, supra, footnote 3, at p. 248. 
70 See Sharpe, supra, footnote 48, at p. 236. 
71 See Irwin Toy (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th)577at p. 618, [I9891 1 S.C.R. 927. 
72 R.S.C. 1985, c. T-19. 
73 See Transport Canada, Impact Assessment, Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regula- 
tions (Ottawa, Transport Canada, 1981), at VI-22. 
74 See Socio Economic Impact Analysis of the Proposed Regulations Concerning Mattress 
Flammability, Secor Inc. (Montreal, 1978), p. 36. The concern is not only with valuing 
social benefits but in discounting the benefits enjoyed by future generations. See E.M. 
Gramlich, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Programs (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . ,  
Prentice-Hall, 1981), Chapter 6, "Valuation of Resources Used or Benefits Created at 
Different Times". 
' 5  The SEIA produced in the aftermath of the 1.5L bottle ban contacted 55 sources, all but 
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Equally significant will be evidence, available in almost all 
cases, that product safety regulation is motivated by a complex 
array of institutional, economic, social and political considerations 
which come together to move  government^.^^ The realities of 
regulation may shatter arguments that the decisions are in some 
sense technical and thus beyond the institutional competence of 
the courts to review in most cases.77 The statement in Irwin Toy 
that all the regulatory agency has to do is to have "had a 
reasonable basis . . . for concluding that the [regulatory action] . . . 
impaired freedom of expression as little as possible given the 
government's pressing and substantial 0bjective",7~ is bizarre if it 
means what it says - that all the regulatory agency has to do is 
demonstrate that it had evidence to justify its own conclusion that 
its actions were constitutional! 
Conclusion 
The consequences of treating commercial speech as a constitu- 
tional right go beyond my concerns that we will have restricted a 
range of possible future choices by regulators to develop more 
effective information regulation policies. Paradoxically, the 
decision to give some protection to commercial expression may 
justify more aggressive, and perhaps unjustifiable, use by 
regulators of more intrusive performance and design standards 
and product bans. Despite being more interventionist, so long as 
the court has not yet "interpreted" economic liberties into the 
Charter, product bans do not appear to be subject to constitu- 
tional review. On the other hand, the adoption of new more 
intrusive and effective information policies may be discarded 
despite the fact that Charter attacks on such legislation may in the 
end be unsuccessful. 
One would be foolish to take my conclusion - that most 
seven of them connected the soft drink industry. See Department of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs, "Proposed Order and Regulations respecting glass containers of a 
capacity of 1.5 litres or more containing a non-alcoholic carbonated beverage", Can. 
Gaz. Part I, Vol. 114,No. 31, August 2,1980, p. 4574. 
76 See "Ad ban motivated by politics, tobacco firm tells court", Globe and Mail, September 
26, 1989, p. B 9. See also, D. Cohen, "The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the 
UFFI Problem: Part I" (1983-84), 8 C.B.L.J. 309; Breyer, supra, footnote 46, at pp. 
34-5. 
77 It all depends of course on the attitudes which judges bring to demands that they "assess 
competing social science evidence". See Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 71, at p. 626. 
78 Ibid. 
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existing information-based product safety regulation is not in 
imminent danger of judicial nullification - as an excuse for 
complacency. As we have seen, many of the reasons for this 
conclusion are cause for concern: the absence of a demonstrated 
political will to push reform further, the power of business 
interests to influence the regulatory process, the uncritical use of 
cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process, and the 
lamentable enforcement record of many of the information-based 
product safety regimes in Canada combine to suggest that the 
impact of the Supreme Court's creation of constitutionally 
protected corporate commercial speech will perpetuate a status 
quo which has little to support it. Simultaneously, cases like Irwin 
Toy and Jones place potential reforms focusing on rigorous gener- 
alized advertising pr~hibi t ions~~ at serious risk of constitutional 
challenge. Like most of what we call law, the Charter will likely 
operate openly to keep the world as it is; it will equally operate 
insidiously against the making of a better world. 
79 Other examples of information-based regulation which may be at risk include strategies 
like that adopted in s. 52(l ) (b)  of the federal Competition Act, which requires infor- 
mation disseminated by producers to be verified by adequate and proper tests. See 
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, as amended. 
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